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Abstract
This work is focused on two applications to economy of the Boltzmann
probability distribution of statistical mechanics. The rst one describes the
distribution of money while the second one the allocation of CO2 emission
permits. The rst application has been the instructive model in our case as
it involves a very simplied idealization of the economy and it has helped us
to submerge into the world of Econophysics. We have digged much deeper
into the second application from which we have suggested a new hypothetical
application for TAC allocation in sheries. One way or another, all cases
studied consist of partitioning of a limited resource among multiple agents.
Keywords: Econophysics, Boltzmann distribution, money distribution, al-
location of permits, partitioning, entropy maximization.
1
Index
1. Introduction 3
2. The Boltzmann distribution 5
3. The Boltzmann distribution of money 8
3.1 Pairwise money transfer without debt 9
3.1.1. Computer simulations 10
3.2. Models with debt 14
3.2.1. Unlimited debt without any restrictions on agentsdebt 14
3.2.2. Limited agentsdebt 15
4. The Boltzmann distribution applied to allocation of permits 16
4.1. The theoretical model of allocation of CO2 emission permits 17
4.1.1. Variable denition 17
4.1.2. The distribution 18
4.1.3. The  value 20
4.2. An updated empirical analysis 21
4.2.1. Further analysis 27
4.3. A tentative application: TAC allocation in sheries 30
5. Conclusions 31
6. References 35
Supplement: Appendix - Physical background
2
1 Introduction
Econophysics is a new interdisciplinary research eld where physicists apply
statistical physics methods to problems in economy. By means of mathemat-
ical methods from statistical physics, econophysics studies statistical proper-
ties of complex economic systems consisting of a large number of interacting
economic agents. It applies to economic and nancial data, increasingly avail-
able with the development of computers and the Internet. These applications
are based on agent-based modeling1 and simulations, where concepts such as
scaling and universality are used.
Indeed, economic and nancial systems su¤er from the same limitation
as systems in astrophysics, atmospherics physics and geophysics in the sense
that principles of the theory of probabilities are needed to describe these
systems. This is so because properties from microscopic equations of motion
cannot be derived. Further, the empirical analysis performed on nancial
or economic data is not equivalent to the usual experimental investigation
carried out in physical sciences. Thus, it is impossible to perform large-scale
experiments in economics and nance that could verify a given theory.
Historically, as far as we know, back in 1936, Ettore Majorana stated for
the rst time the analogy between statistical laws in physics and in social sci-
ences, and this is the point where interest in nancial and economic systems
originates. By that time, this was considered an unconventional perspective,
but with time both physics and economics became more formal in their re-
search, and the relation between social sciences and statistical physics was
left behind.
It was not until 1974 that the statistical physicist Elliott Montroll coau-
thored the book Introduction to Quantitative Aspects of Social Phenomena
(Montroll and Badger (1974)). Another early attempt to bring together the
leading theoretical physicists and economists at the Santa Fe Institute was
not entirely successful (Anderson, Arrow, and Pines (1988)). Physicist Stan-
ley was the rst to use the term "econophysics" arguing that "behavior of
large numbers of humans (as measured, e.g., by economic indices) might
conform to analogs of the scaling laws that have proved useful in describing
systems composed of large numbers of inanimate objects" (Mantegna and
Stanley (1999)). Although the actual status of econophysics within physics
and economics elds is still di¤use, it can be said that for the late 1990s, the
attempts to apply statistical physics to social phenomena consolidated into a
1Agent-based model (ABM) is a type of computational model for simulating actions
and interactions of autonomous agents (both individual or collective entities) with a view
to assessing their e¤ects on the system as a whole.
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solid movement of econophysics and sociophysics.2 Econophysics focuses on
the economic behavior of humans, where more quantitative data is available,
while sociophysics studies social issues. The boundary between these two
topics is not that sharp, and both elds are frequently mixed (Chakrabarti,
Chakraborti, and Chatterjee (2006)).3
On the other hand, the number of economists following this tendency is
growing, but still most of the econophysics papers have been published in
physics journals: (i) The journal Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its
Applications has emerged as the leader in econophysics publications and has
even attracted submissions from some well known economists. (ii) Several
well-known economists, Blume (1993) and Foley (1994) among them, applied
statistical physics to economic problems. Gradually, reputable economics
journals as Games and Economic Behavior and Journal of Economic The-
ory are also starting to publish econophysics papers. (iii) There is a Physics
and Astronomy Classication Scheme PACS number for econophysics, and
Physical Review E has published many papers on this subject. (iv) Econo-
physics sessions are included in the annual meetings of physical societies and
statistical physics conferences (see http://www.unifr.ch/econophysics/.)
When modern econophysics began to emerge in the middle of 1990s, ana-
lysis of nancial markets attracted most of the attention. The nancial
branch of econophysics applies concepts from probability theory to nan-
cial time series in order to gain new understanding of how nancial markets
behave. Financial markets are exceptionally well dened complex systems.
They can be constantly followed in time scales of seconds while every eco-
nomic transaction is virtually recorded and there is a huge amount of this
data available for research. Financial markets are open systems that present
many of the properties that characterize complex systems in which many
subunits interact nonlinearly in the presence of feedback.
Another direction within economics is the application of statistical mech-
anics to social and economic inequality. Entropy maximization concept
brings up the Boltzmann distribution of energy, which is the fundamental
equilibrium law in statistical mechanics based on the conservation of energy
and it used in a number of elds. This fact suggests the possible general-
ization that any conserved quantity in a big statistical system follows such
probability distribution in equilibrium. Following this idea Dr¼agulescu and
Yakovenko (2000) study the probability distributions of money, wealth, and
2Sociophysics is the study of social and political behavior using tools and concepts from
the physics of disordered matter.
3The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (Rosser, 2008) includes an entry on eco-
nophysics.
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income in a closed society.4 More recently the Boltzmann distribution has
also been applied to allocation problems (see Park et al. (2012).)
This work is focused on two applications to economy of the Boltzmann
probability distribution of statistical mechanics, where the two share the ob-
jective of partitioning a limited resource among multiple agents. The
rst application describes the distribution of money based on the pairwise
money transfer models presented in Dr¼agulescu and Yakovenko (2000). Due
to the fact that it involves a very simplied idealization of the economy, this
application has been a much more instructive exercise in order to submerge
into the world of Econophysics. We have studied much more into depth the
second application, carried out by Park et al. (2012), that describes the al-
location of CO2 emission permits through the Boltzmann distribution. After
developing di¤erent exercises for a certain empirical data, we have outlined
a hypothetical model for TAC allocation in sheries in the European Union,
application suggested by Park et al. (2012).
The work is organized as follows: In Section 2 some basic notions about
the Boltzmann probability distribution are introduced. Section 3 contains
models of the application of the distribution of money. Section 4 details in
rst place the application of trading emission permits to pollute. Di¤erent
exercises are carried out in order to analyze the properties of the distribution.
The last part of this section briey describes an application to the allocation
of shing quotas in the European Union. Section 5 brings out the results
and conclusions from the work. The Appendix in the Supplement, form-
ally develops statistical mechanics required to understand these applications
regarding the Boltzmann distribution of energy.
2 The Boltzmann distribution
In this section we are going to informally describe the Boltzmann distribution
of energy and the concepts used throughout the work. For their formal
derivation,see the Appendix in the Supplement.
Let us consider an isolated system with a great number of particles that
can occupy one of the energy levels Ei. At any time t, the particles are
distributed among the di¤erent levels so that n0 particles have energy E0,
n1 particles have energy E1 and so on. The total number of particles is
4See Banerjee and Yakovenko (2010) and Yakovenko and Barkley (2009). See also
http://physics.umd.edu/~yakovenk/econophysics/
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N = n0 + n1 + ::: and given that the system is isolated, the total energy
remains constant so that E = n0E0 + n1E1 + n2E2 + ::: Due to interactions
and collisions between the particles, numbers n0; n1; n2::: are continuously
changing. We can suppose that for each macroscopic state of the system,
there is a distribution of the particles among the di¤erent levels that is more
probable that any other. Once this distribution is reached, the system is said
to be in equilibrium. So numbers n0; n1; n2::: can then uctuate around the
equilibrium state without making any macroscopic change. Let us determine
the way in which the particles of an isolated system distribute among the
permitted energy levels.
In classical statistics, the particles of a system are identical but indistin-
guishable. That means, that at macroscopic scale we cannot distinguish a
particle from the other, but we can imagine that at microscopic scale we have
some sort of procedure to identify the individual particles. It is important to
di¤erentiate the macrostate and the microstate of the system. Macroscopic
properties, such as pressure and temperature, are determined by the macro-
state of the system. The corresponding microstates to such macrostate are
experimentally indistinguishable between them. The number of microstates
that correspond to the given macrostate is represented by 
 and is:

 =
N !
n0!n1!n2!:::::
(1)
Postulate 1; Equiprobability a priori: A closed system5 in equilibrium has
the same probability to be in any of its accessible6 microstates.
In other words, probability to nd the system in state r is Pr = 1
 .
Thus, the macrostate that has the largest number of microstates is the most
probable macrostate of the system. Distribution fn0; n1; n2; n3:::g for which

 has its greatest value, is the most probable distribution of the particles of
the system among its energy levels (equilibrium state of the system).
In a system in thermal equilibrium, interactions between particles (colli-
sions) change the system towards a macrostate that has practically the same
number of microstates than the initial one. In order to nd the most prob-
able distribution of an isolated system, the number of microstates 
 has to
be calculated rst so that the total energy remain constant. Maximum value
of 
 is obtained when the distribution of particles ni is a decreasing function
5Closed system has energy E, number of particles N and volume V all constant.
6Accessible microstates meaning to have compatible properties with the properties
specied from the system: energy within the systems energy interval, equal number of
particles to represent the number of particles of both the microstate and the system.
6
of the energy levels Ei:
ni = C  exp( Ei) (2)
Positive quantity  determines the speed at which ni decreases when
energy Ei increases. Constant C is determined so the total number of
particles that occupy accessible energy levels is N . Function (2) is called
the Boltzmann distribution of energy and provides the most probable
distribution in which particles in a physical system in equilibrium occupy the
i-th states with energy Ei:
Based on the Boltzmann distribution, the probability Pi that a system
can be found in a certain state i with energy Ei is inversely proportional to
the exponential function of the energy:
P ("i) = C
0  exp(  "i
kBT
) (3)
where C 0 is a normalization constant, T is the temperature of the system and
kB is the Boltzmann constant.7 Expression (3) shows that the states with
lower energy will have higher probability of being occupied than the states
with higher energy. The system in this case may range from an atom, to a
gas in a tank, and this is the reason why the Boltzmann distribution is very
useful and can be applied in such a variety of cases.
In addition, it is known from thermodynamics that an isolated system
tends to its equilibrium state by maximization of its entropy S. Entropy S
is the measure of disorder in the system. Such disorder in physical statistics
can be translated as the measure of number of accessible microstates (meas-
ure of unpredictability). The process of entropy maximization in statistical
physics translates as an isolated system maximizing the number of accessible
microstates 
 (or ln
) given by the following relation:
S = kB ln
 (4)
Expression (4) is the bridge between thermodynamics (macrostate) on the
left and microscopic world on the right. Note that when 
 = 1 (S = 0) there
is a single microstate accessible to the system and the microscopic state of
the system is completely predictable. According to this, we might introduce
the maximum entropy principle that states that the probability distribution
that best represents the current state of knowledge is the one with the largest
entropy.
7This could be generalized to the continuous case: P (")d" = C 0  exp(  "kBT )d", which
is the probability of the system to be in a state with energy between " and "+ d".
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Given the simplicity of the derivation of (2) i.e. the statistical charac-
ter of the system and the conservation of energy, Dr¼agulescu and Yakovenko
(2000) wondered if any conserved quantity in a big statistical system in equi-
librium follows the Boltzmann probability distribution. In the same way that
statistical mechanics studies collections of atoms, economy considers a huge
amount of participating agents. For that reason, economy may be perceived
as big statistical system and the Boltzmann distribution can be naturally
applied.
3 The Boltzmann distribution of money
In this section we discuss some applications in economics of the Boltzmann
probability distribution carried out by Dr¼agulescu and Yakovenko (2000).
Given that energy is the conserved quantity in statistical mechanics,
money is now considered to be the conserved quantity in a closed economy
with total amount of money M and many economic agents N . Therefore, if
in statistical mechanics energy follows the Boltzmann distribution that gives
probability distribution of energy P (") = C  exp(  "
T
), we wonder whether
or not money follows such distribution
P (m) = D  exp(  m
Tm
) (5)
where m is the money, D a normalization constant and Tm is the "money
temperature" which are found from normalization conditions
1R
0
P (m)dm = 1 and
1R
0
m  P (m)dm = M
N
(6)
from which D = 1
T
and Tm = MN are calculated.
8 From the preceding
relation, "money temperature" Tm represents the average amount of money
per economic agent.
This equilibrium distribution P (m) is derived in the same way as the
equilibrium distribution of energy P (") in statistical mechanics. One way is
the derivation followed in physics by bringing two subsystems into thermal
contact (see Supplement) while the energy of the composite system remains
constant, but just taking into account that money is conserved and additive:
m = m1 + m2. P (m) can also be derived within the canonical ensemble
8In this case, the Boltzmann constant kB is set to unity so the temperature is measured
in energy units and denes the average energy per particle T < " > up to a numerical
coe¢ cient of the order of 1.
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(see Supplement) by means of maximization of entropy. This leads to the
denition of the entropy of money distribution
S =
1R
0
dmP (m)  lnP (m) (7)
which when maximized with respect to the total number of economic agents
in a bin (as in state i in physics) with the constrains of the total money M
and the total number of agents N , generates the Boltzmann distribution for
P (m).
It is important to remark the di¤erence between money distribution and
wealth distribution. Money is just a fraction of the total wealth while wealth
includes non conserved material products that can be manufactured, des-
troyed and consumed (foods for example can be eaten or can go rot and
disappear). Measuring units also bring this lack of conservation up. As op-
posed to goods, money is always measured in a the same unit. Thus only
money ow is going under study here.
3.1 Pairwise money transfer without debt
Now we are going to model a very simplied economic situation for the study
of the probability distribution of money P (m) among economic agents. Pair-
wise money transfer models represent a primitive market. Even in modern
economies dominated by big enterprises, these models are attractive because
of their simplicity as they result very instructive. We consider that the
economy is in equilibrium and therefore we are searching for a stationary
probability distribution of money P (m). First, idealizations must be done in
order to guarantee systems stability and statistical equilibrium in the model:
The process we are going to consider is the economic transaction between
agents where agent i pays the amount of money m to the agent j. The
process requires the following assumptions:
A.1: The number of participating economic agents (individuals or cor-
porations) in the system is xed and very large N  1. Money can only be
transferred between these economic agents.
A.2: Money manufacture is not permitted. An increase in material pro-
duction does not produce an automatic increase in money fund. Only a
central bank has the monopoly of changing the money balance. Money trans-
action is given in one country with only one currency, so the total amount
of money in the system is conserved. Then the economy under study is a
closed system. This is the same as physics starts from the study of ideal
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closed systems as in thermal equilibrium and then generalizes by getting rid
of restrictive conditions.
A.3: Money is on exchange of economic activity and it is used as means
of exchange goods or services. We do not consider the transaction of goods
or services since they are not perdurable.
A.4: Debt (considered as negative money from individual economic agents
point of view) is not allowed as it may disturb money conservation. In ana-
logy with physics where kinetic energy of atoms is "i  0, agents money
mi  0 for all i. Agent i cannot buy anything from other agents if has no
money mi = 0, but can receive money from other agents.
A.5: In order money transaction to happen, we assume each agent has
enough money to pay mi  m.
The agentsmoney balances develop as:
mi  ! m0i = mi  m and mj  ! m0j = mj +m (8)
This equation in economy corresponds in physics to the transfer of energy
from one molecule to another in molecular collisions in a gas.. Hence the
money is conserved during the transaction:
mi +mj = m
0
i +m
0
j (9)
3.1.1 Computer simulations
In order to justify these conjectures, Dr¼agulescu and Yakovenko (2000) car-
ried out some computer simulations of money transfers between agents with
the following characteristics:
All agents start with the same amount of money. For example $1000, as
represented by the double vertical line in Figure 1.
Pair of agents i and j are selected randomly and transaction begins:
agent i (randomly chosen to be the loser) transfers amount m  0 to
agent j (randomly chosen to be the winner) as represented in (8). Recall
that if loser i does not have enough money to pay (mi < m), then money
transaction does not happen, and another pair of agents must me picked.
Transaction process is repeated many times.
Several di¤erent exchange rules for m were considered in simulations
by Dr¼agulescu and Yakovenko (2000): (a) small xed amount m = 1,
(b) random fraction v (0  v  1) of the average money in the system
m = vM
N
and (c) random fraction v (0  v  1) of the average money of
the pair m = v(mi+mj)
2
.
The nal stationary distribution was found to be the same for all three
trades.
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Time evolution of the distribution of money is illustrated in computer
animations by Chen and Yakovenko (2007) and by Wright (2007):
http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/StatisticalMechanicsOfMoney/
(a) Transferring xed constant quantity m = $1 represents the economical
case where all agents sell their products for the same price ($1)9. Figure
1 shows six di¤erent snapshots from computer animation 1.
Figure 1: Time evolution of distribution of money and of entropy represen-
ted by six di¤erent moments in computer animation 1. For each instant,
the gure on the top is the distribution of money (histogram). The gure
underneath is the entropy as a function of time. Solid red curve ts the
Boltzmann distribution.
While agents exchange money, the initial delta-function distribution
P (m) = (m  M
N
) rst broadens symmetrically to a Gaussian curve as
shown in Figure 1. Due to the imposed boundary condition of no debt
m  0, probability distribution starts to concentrate around m = 0
state. As a result, P (m) becomes biased (asymmetric) and in the course
of time, money distribution reaches the expected stationary exponential
shape as shown in Figure 2:
9Agents paying the same prices m for the same products, independent of their money
balances m, seems very appropriate for the modern anonymous economy, especially for
purchases over the Internet.
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Figure 2: Histogram and points: stationary probability distribution P (m).
Solid red curve ts the Boltzmann distribution P (m). Vertical lines repres-
ent the initial distribution of money $1000.
(b) Transferring m = v(M
N
) a random fraction of the average amount of
money per agent, where v is a uniformly distributed random num-
ber between 0 and 1, represents a wide variety of prices for di¤erent
products in real economy. Agents can buy and consume varied quant-
ities among a variety of products (simple or complex, cheap or ex-
pensive. . . ). In Figure 3, six snapshots from computer animation 2
are shown in order to see time evolution. Again, with time, the same
distribution is reached.
(c) Transferring m = v(mi+mj)
2
a random fraction of the average amount
of money of the two agents, where v is a uniformly distributed random
number between 0 and 1, also reaches the same stationary probability
distribution in (5) with time.
As shown in the bottom gure of Figures 1 and 3, computer animations
also represent the growth of the entropy of money distribution (7): S starts
from initial value 0 where all agents have the same money. When trans-
actions starts S increases with time until saturation at the maximal value
when reached statistical equilibrium. In the Figure 4 we can compare time
evolution of entropy for the presented exchange models (a) and (b) in the
text.
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Figure 3: Time evolution of distribution of money and of entropy represen-
ted by six di¤erent moments in computer animation 2. For each instant,
the gure on the top is the distribution of money (histogram). The gure
underneath is the entropy as a function of time. Solid red curve ts the
Boltzmann distribution.
Figure 4: Time evolution of entropy. Top curve shows entropy time-evolution
computed for the model of exchange (b) of the text while the bottom curve
for model (a). The time scale for the bottom curve is 500 times greater
than indicated so ends at the time 106. Thus, exchange in model (a) is
much slower than in model (b), but systems in both models eventually reach
the Boltzmann state of maximal entropy.
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Let us point out the following observations:
1. Boundary condition at m = 0 represents the ground state of energy in
statistical mechanics. Without this boundary condition, the probability
distribution of money would not reach a stationary state.
2. Money temperature Tm is equal to the average amount of the available
money per agent M
N
, thus it depends on the boundary conditions.
At this point, despite the di¤erences in rules for transfer m , the nal
probability distribution of money (5) for pairwise money transfer seems to
be universal in these settings but as we shall see, this is not the case.
3.2 Models with debt
In cases up until now, debt was not permitted as in theory disturbed money
conservation. We proceed to consider two cases of pairwise money transfer
m between agents i and j where now debt is allowed mi < 0 and check
whether probability distribution of money P (m) still tends to the exponential
function (5).
Money conservation is the main principle not to skip. Following assump-
tions are required for these processes:
A.1: The bank is a big reservoir of money apart from the system of
ordinary economic agents.
A.2: Transactions may happen when agents have no money to pay m
by borrowing money from the bank. Then agents money balance (positive
money M) increases while earns a debt (negative money D). Total money
balance of the agent remains the same. Thus, borrowing money from the
bank still satises the generalized conservation law of the total money rep-
resented by money balance: Mb = M   D where Mb is the monetary base
(money in the central bank and not available to the public).
A.3: Interests rates on borrowed money are not considered.
A.4: When an agent with a negative balance receives money, the agent
uses this money to repay the debt until balance becomes positive.
Observe that m = 0 is not the ground state any more in neither of the
following models.
3.2.1 Unlimited debt without any restrictions on agentsdebt
As in (8), transaction now sets a new negative balance of agent i :
m0i = mi  m < 0 (10)
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First simulations were carried out without any restrictions on debt and the
results were that the probability distribution of money P (m) never stabilizes.
As opposed to cases without debt (m  0), now P (m) distribution with
time keeps spreading symmetrically to a Gaussian without limits towards
m = +1 and m =  1 and the system never reaches a stationary state.
The fact of debt being unlimited, or not having any boundary condition (like
m = 0 before) is clearly the reason why P (m) never reaches the exponential
form.
This model of unlimited debt in a system represents nancial crisis where
some agents go into debt with negative balances m < 0 and without pro-
ducing anything in exchange while other agents become richer with positive
balances m > 0.
3.2.2 Limited agentsdebt
In order to prevent the growth of debt with no limits and so to ensure the sta-
bility of the system, new boundary conditions must be imposed. Dr¼agulescu
and Yakovenko (2000) made computer simulations of a simple model as in
the previous section with boundary condition for all agents i, mi   md
where md is the debt limit of each agent. Results are shown in Figure 5. As
expected, the stationary money distribution P (m) recovers the exponential
shape, but now with the new boundary condition at m =  md instead of at
m = 0.
Figure 5: Computer simulation for two di¤erent cases of limited debt: curve
for md = 800 and curve for md = 0.
By allowing agents to go into limitedmd debt, the amount of money avail-
able to each agent has increased md. As a consequence, money temperature
15
(Tm = md +
Mb
N
) increases correspondingly. The higher the temperature,
the broader money distribution. This means that debt increases inequality
between agents.
We have presented through distinct idealized models how the Boltzmann
probability distribution does not necessarily hold for any conservative model
in economic settings.
Other exchange models have been presented in the econophysics literat-
ure, and di¤erent distributions have been found. Dr¼agulescu and Yakovenko
(2000) carried out further studies in the universality of the money distri-
bution. They brought up symmetry conditions of the models showing that
the Boltzmann distribution (5) can be derived from the Boltzmann kinetic
equation. It turns out that the Boltzmann distribution is the stationary
solution of the Boltzmann kinetic equation. Nevertheless, in the absence of
detailed knowledge of real microscopic dynamics of economic exchanges, the
Boltzmann distribution seems to be an appropriate starting point.
4 The Boltzmann distribution applied to al-
location of permits
In this section we present the application of the Boltzmann distribution to
the allocation of CO2 emission permits based on the paper by Park et al.
(2012). The paper contains an empirical application of the model for years
2007-2008. After describing the theoretical model, we do not go into their
results but we do update the empirical application for years 2010-2011. In
addition we develop two new exercises with the aim of a deeper study of the
properties of the Boltzmann distribution. Finally, following the work by Park
et al. (2012), we outline a possible application of the Boltzmann distribution
to sheries.
It is known that CO2 emissions to the atmosphere cause irreversible dam-
age in our planet. International reaction is needed in order to confront such
problem and world CO2 emissions must be reduced to slow global warming
down. The Kyoto Protocol is an international environmental treaty whose
aim is to stabilize atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to prevent dan-
gerous interference with climate. It was embraced on December 1997 in
Kyoto (Japan) and entered into force on February in 2005. Without im-
positions, it requires to set limits for individual countries on greenhouse gas
emissions. There are 197 countries that meet annually in conferences to deal
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with climate change and discuss how to achieve the treatys aims. The Pro-
tocol requires the developed countries to reduce current emissions that are
historically guilty for the actual greenhouse gases levels in the atmosphere.
One of the proposals to control pollution is a market-based system known
as emission permits trading. This system allows countries to decide how to
accomplish policy targets, and works as follows: a central authority allocates
or sells a limited number of permits to pollute. Polluters are required to hold
permits in equal amount to their emissions. The ones that want to increase
their emissions must buy permits to the ones that wish to sell them. In
general, these permits are sold in the international market at the prevailing
market price, so there is permit transfer between countries. Indeed the ow
and value of what is traded depends on its initial allocation.
The initial allocation of permits is a disputed task as it has to be fair for
the countries that take part in the system. The total amount of permits may
be distributed in di¤erent ways among participants. But the key question is
who has the right to clean away air. If the answer is that industry has the
right to pollute, permits are allocated for free based on past pollution. But if
no one has the right to pollute without compensating society, then polluters
have to pay for it. There are two known proposals: (i) Grandfathering al-
locates permits for free based on historical emissions. (ii) Auctioning of the
permits consists of selling permits to polluters that bid highest.
Both systems have limitations: Grandfathering rewards those rms that
have polluted excessively in the past. Auctioning may damage to countries
with incipient industry, which would hardly get any permit.
Park et al. (2012) argue that Boltzmann probability distribution provides
a simple and natural rule for allocating emission permits among countries by
describing the most probable distribution of emissions permits.
4.1 The theoretical model of allocation of CO2 emis-
sion permits
First, we present the replacement of the concepts of the Boltzmann distribu-
tion from statistical mechanics (3) into the emission permit allocation frame.
4.1.1 Variable denition
-The system in statistical mechanics is reinterpreted as CO2 emissions trading
system.
-Particles in statistical mechanics correspond to emission permits units.
-The i th state in statistical mechanics is the j th individual in i th
country.
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-Energy "i of the i th substate in statistical mechanics corresponds to
energy per capita Ei of the country i.10 Ei of country i is negatively propor-
tional to the actual CO2 emissions per capita of country i.
An essential assumption is required: all individuals in a country make the
same contribution to the total CO2 emissions of such country i. Therefore,
the probability that a unit emission permit is allocated to a country i should
be proportional to its total population Ci.
4.1.2 The distribution
In accordance to the variable replacement the Boltzmann distribution for per-
mit allocation is dened as the probability Pi that a unit permit is allocated
to a country i, which for now, we might only say is inversely proportional to
the exponential function of the allocation energy per capita Ei:
Pi  Ci exp( Ei);  > 0 (11)
where positive constant  corresponds to the positive temperatures of a sys-
tem in physics.
The authors present a diagram that illustrates the idea of permit allocation
using the Boltzmann distribution that we reproduce in the following
gure:
Figure 6: Permit allocation using the Boltzmann distribution. The total
available emissions permits N (rst box) is divided into N (number of unit
emissions permits) pieces of unit permit  (same box, di¤erent distribution).
Then the emissions permits are allocated to country i (i = 1; 2; 3), based
on probability Pi.
To develop the model the following ingredients are also required:
- There are n participating countries: each country i (i = 1; 2; 3; : : : ; n)
has population Ci and energy per capita Ei.
10Ei is now an intensive variable (independent to the size of the system) for the country
i.
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- N is the total available emission permits allocated to the countries
where  is the unit permit and N is the total number of permits. (Note that
by making unit  su¢ ciently small, the number of unit permits N can be
made large enough for the Boltzmann statistics to be applied).
- N ji represents the number of unit permits that are allocated to the j th
individual in a country i which depends on its energy per capita Ei:
 During the allocation process, emission permits cannot be taken away
and cannot be added. The total number of available unit permits N is
conserved. So we add the number of unit permits that are allocated to
the j th individual in country i N ij , for all population in the country
Ci and for all n countries:
nP
i=1
CiP
j=1
N ji = N (12)
 Let E be the total global allocation energy which must be conserved.
E has to be regulated based on the agreement among the participating
countries and it controls the general distribution of the emissions per-
mits over countries. It is calculated by the product of the allocation
energy per capita of a country i Ei and the number of unit permits
allocated to the j th individual in a country i N ji all added for all
population of a country i for all n participants countries:
nP
i=1
CiP
j=1
(N ji Ei) = E (13)
As in statistical mechanics, the Boltzmann distribution for permit alloc-
ation is valid under constraints (12) and (13). Further, since the Boltzmann
distribution is based on entropy maximization, the greatest number of unit
permit that individual j th in country i can receive is dened as:
N ji = A exp( Ei) (14)
with constant A. Note that N ji is only a function of energy per capita of Ei.
Constant A can be calculated by means of restriction in (12):
nP
i=1
CiP
j=1
N ji =
nP
i=1
CiP
j=1
A exp( Ei) =
nP
i=1
ACi exp( Ei) = N (15)
Solving for A:
A =
1
nP
i=1
Ci exp( Ei)
(16)
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Therefore the probability that a unit permit is allocated to a country
i is the ratio between all the permits allocated to a country and the total
number of the available permits:
Pi =
CiP
j=1
N ji
N
=
CiN
j
i
N
=
Ci exp( Ei)
nP
i=1
Ci exp( Ei)
(17)
Expression (17) veries expression (11) in which Pi is proportional to
the population Ci of country i and inversely proportional to the exponential
function of the allocation energy per capita Ei.
Finally, the amount of emission permits allocated to country i
is the product between the total available emissions permits N and the
probability Pi of getting one:
Pi  N = N Ci exp( Ei)nP
i=1
Ci exp( Ei)
(18)
4.1.3 The  value
The  value has to be determined by all the countries in the system. Let us
illustrate what the meaning of this parameter is by means of analyzing the
limit cases.
1. Suppose that  ! 0, then the probability that a unit emissions permit
is allocated to a country i in (17) only depends on the populations
of the participating countries. Hence, for two countries with similar
energy per capita Ei the country with larger population is rewarded.
This situation can be interpreted as egalitarian (which in this setting
means all people have an equal right to pollute or to be protected from
pollution) since every individual in each country is assigned with the
same number of unit permits.
2. Suppose that  ! 1, then probability in (17) takes values di¤erent
from 0 only for the countries with the lowest allocation energy per
capita Ei. These countries will share all the available emission permits.
But all other countries with close to null probability will not be satised
as they obtain few permits.
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Recall that the allocation energy per capita Ei of a country i is assumed to
be negatively proportional to the CO2 emissions per capita of a country i (the
essential assumption). Hence, from limit cases we conclude that countries
with higher CO2 emissions per capita will prefer larger values of , while
countries with lower CO2 emissions per capita prefer smaller  values. So a
proper  value can be di¢ cult to nd as there is no value that satises all
countries.
Authors suggest a value for , using the least square y calculation between
the allocated permits and demand. When y has its minimum value at a 
value,  is considered a reference point.
y =
nP
i=1
(permitsi   demandi)2 (19)
4.2 An updated empirical analysis
Park et al. (2012) illustrate the application using data from 2007 and 2008
for Canada, China, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and
the United States (n = 8). In order to see the performance of the application,
we have carried out analogous calculations and graphical representations for
the same countries but for 2010 and 2011 which is the latest available data.11
The data required are the CO2 emissions and the population for the
selected countries in years 2010 and 2011 shown in Table 1 along with the
calculation of emission per capita in 2011, that is, the quotient between
emissions and population. For this example the total amount of allowed
permits for 2011 is the 97% of the total emissions of the preceding year:
N = 18; 160; 003 (1000 metric tons) is total available permits that will be
allocated among the countries. We have made the assumption that the energy
per capita Ei of a country i is the negative value of CO2 emissions per capita
of a country i in 2011.
11Sources:
- Emissions:
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=co2+emissions&d=MDG&f=seriesRowID%3a749
- Population:
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=population+datamart%5bWDI%5d&d=WDI&f=
Indicator_Code%3aSP.POP.TOTL
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Table 1: The carbon dioxide emissions in 2010 and 2011, population in 2011
and CO2 per capita in 2011.
As we have said, agreement on the value of  is crucial in the allocation.
The following graph shows how this parameter a¤ects the amount of emission
permits for each country. We consider a reasonable range of  values [0; 3]
and we plug in the data from Table 1 into expression (18) for each country.
The result is largely a¤ected by the  value, as shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7: Permit allocation in countries using the Boltzmann distribution as
a function of the  value. A zoom-in has been done in order to appreciate
the curves in the more denser area, shown on the right side of the image.
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From Figure 7 we can see the following situation:
1. In the United States (light green in Figure 7 ) the amount of emissions
permits allocated are least when  is 0. The amount increases rapidly
up to   0:5, and beyond that it increases slower until approaches the
total amount of available emissions permits. Permits allocated to China
(red) are most when  is 0. The amount rapidly decreases up to   0:5
and then approaches 0. In Italy and in the UK permits allocated are the
largest when the  is 0 and then the amount monotonously decreases up
to the   0:3. For the rest of the countries (Canada, Germany, Japan
and Russia) the amount of permits rst increases and then gradually
decreases to 0 in the given  value range.
2. The United States meets its demand in 2011 (see Table 1 ) when 
is 0.0973. Therefore, the United States prefers larger  values than
0.0973. Canada prefers  values between 0.1273 and 0.7636 (between
the two values of  at which the allocated permits meet their actual
CO2 emissions in 2011). China prefers  values smaller than 0.0462;
Italy prefers  values smaller than 0.0779 and the United Kingdom
prefers smaller s than 0.0701. The three remaining countries (Ger-
many, Japan, Russia) cannot obtain su¢ cient permits to meet their
actual emissions in 2011. The reason for that is that the total allowed
emissions permits in 2011 (97% of 2010 emissions: 18,160,003) is less
than the total CO2 emissions in 2011 (19,381,942).
3. Another result that can be seen is the permit allocation dispute between
China and the United States. China produces the greatest CO2 emis-
sions, but has the smallest CO2 emissions per capita due to its huge
population while the United States has the greatest CO2 emissions per
capita (see Table 1). This observation brings up a challenging question
in the reduction of the CO2 emissions. Which country should be most
responsible for future reduction: the one that produces the greatest
CO2 emissions overall (China), or the one that produces the greatest
CO2 emissions per capita (the United States)? In permit allocation by
means of the Boltzmann distribution, the responsibility can be shifted
between both by making changes in the  value, as shown in Figure
7. When  is 0.1399, both countries have equal amount of permits.
Below that value, China receives more permits than the United States
so the United States would be more responsible for pollution. Above
such value the United States receives more permits than China, leaving
more responsibility to China. This result shows the exibility of applic-
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ation of the models of the Boltzmann distribution and the importance
of determining a proper  value.
Next, as suggested, we derive the least square calculation for  between
the allocated permits (results from Figure 7) and demand (actual CO2 emis-
sions in 2011). The least square value y has its minimum at the  value of
0.0880, at which the di¤erence between the allocated permits and demand
becomes the smallest for the eight participating countries. This  value
provides a reference point for the permit allocation.
Figure 8: Function y() where its minimum yields for  = 0:0880:
Results for =0.0880
Considering the value for  of 0.0880 Table 2 summarizes the results of
emissions permit allocation. The probability Pi values for permit allocation
are distributed between 0.02 and 0.48 for the eight countries. The number of
emissions permits allocated to the countries ranges from 383,672 to 8,692,547
(1000 metric tons).
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Table 2: Emissions permits of the selected eight countries using the Boltzmann
distribution for  = 0:0880: CO2 emissions in 2011 (1000 metric tons),
the Boltzmann probability Pi, the allocated permits (1000 metric tons) and
the di¤erence (allocated permits actual CO2 emissions in 2011).
From results in Table 2, in Figure 9 we might compare the allocated
permits using the Boltzmann distribution with the reference  value ( =
0:0880) and the actual CO2 emissions in 2011.
Figure 9: Permit allocation using the Boltzmann distribution with the least
square reference  value ( = 0.0880). It shows the CO2 emissions in 2011
of the participating countries and the emissions permits allocated.
Comparison between the two numerical exercises
Let us compare the results presented in the Park et al. paper which
slightly di¤er from our preceding results.
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1. Unlike in Park et al. (2012) work, we observe how none of the countries
exceed their demands and that they all emitted more than the permits
they got. This does not necessarily imply that for this particular ex-
ample, permits cannot be traded between the selected countries. There
may trade between the countries but in this case we cannot distinct at
rst sight which country will be the buyer and which country will be the
seller. This will depend on the market price of the permits. Typically
developed countries will be the buyers of the permits. Nevertheless,
regarding the fact that this empirical analysis shows permit allocation
among this particular eight countries, if more countries are either added
or subtracted, then permit sellers and permit buyers could be di¤erent.
2. All countries seems to have changed similarly and follow the same be-
havior. Of course they all meet their demands for di¤erent  values
due to the di¤erence in their CO2 emissions in 2007 and 2008. Again,
the total amount of available permit is taken to be the 97% of the emis-
sions from 2007 that make 17,084,135 permits. The only country that
has changed its behavior from 2008 and 2011 is the United Kingdom
where in 2008 was not able to obtain su¢ cient permits to meet its de-
mand. The competition between China and the United States is still
detectable.
3. The least square value of  has diminished. In Park et al. (2012) work
y was 0.0966, while in our empirical exercise is of 0.0880.
4. The probability Pi values for permit allocation are distributed in a sim-
ilar way and the number of emissions permits allocated to the countries
ranges from 392,870 to 7,079,729 (1000 metric tons).
5. As opposed to the analogue problem for the date in 2010, China and the
United States exceeded their demands while the remaining six countries
(Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom), did
not. For the data in 2008, after the initial permit allocation, emissions
trading can occur between permit sellers (China and the United States)
and permit buyers (Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the
United Kingdom). Authors consider that it is also possible that extra
emission permits can be considered and supplied through developing
technology, tree planting, reducing CO2 emissions by carbon tax during
emissions trading.
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4.2.1 Further analysis
With the aim of studying the behavior of the allocation of permits induced
by the Boltzmann distribution we modify the empirical analysis, in two
di¤erent ways: we reduce the number of countries and the targets of emission
reduction. China and the United States have been left aside because they are
the more polluting countries in the preceding selection. Therefore we execute
the same exercise for the remaining six countries (n = 6 Canada, Germany,
Italy, Japan, Russia and the United Kingdom). Then we perform the analysis
for these six countries with a di¤erent target to analyze the consistency of
the method.
a) A change in the number of countries (n) : First of all, we execute
the exercise in the same way di¤ering only in the selected countries. For
this reason all of the totals in Table 1 (last row) change as shown in Table
3. We nd that the total amount of allowed permits to be allocated among
the countries is now N = 4; 904; 140 (1000 metric tons). Recall that this
number comes from taking the 97% of the total of the CO2 emissions in the
year 2010 which is 5,055,814 (1000 metric tons). Next, we specify the results:
1. As known, the  value determines the allocation of permits but the
allocation results are di¤erent. Russia is the only country that rst
increases the amount of allocated permits with increasing  and then
gradually decreases. Canada the amount of permits allocated reaches
a minimum when  is 0 and then increases gradually. The remaining
four countries (Italy, Germany, Japan and the United Kingdom) reach
their maximum amount when  is 0, and then monotonously decreases
up to the   0:5.
2. The least square value y has its minimum at the  value of 0.1025,
at which the di¤erence between the allocated permits and demand be-
comes the smallest for the six participating countries. Even though this
value of  is considered a reference point, it has considerably changed.
3. Considering the value for  of 0.1025, Table 3 summarizes the results of
emission permit allocation for the six countries. As we can appreciate
in the last column of the following table, Canada and Italy exceed
their demands while the remaining four countries (Germany, Japan,
Russia, and the United Kingdom), do not. Thus, after the initial permit
allocation, emissions trading can occur between permit sellers (Canada
and Italy) and permit buyers (Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United
Kingdom).
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Table 3: Emissions permits of the new selection of six countries for  =
0.1025: CO2 emissions in 2011 (1000 metric tons), the probability Pi, the
allocated permits (1000 metric tons) and the di¤erence (allocated permits 
actual CO2 emissions in 2011). The total amount of permits to be allocated
is N = 4,904,140 (1000 metric tons).
From this analysis, we can conrm that the di¤erences between the coun-
tries are not that big as in the preceding analysis and that the range of
results is not that broad. This is due to getting rid of the most pollutant
global powers. As expected, the results on permit allocation depends on
which countries have been selected.
b) The robustness of the Boltzmann distribution: One interesting
question is how robust is the Boltzmann distribution in the following sense.
Once an allocation has been determined, assume that some agents take their
awards and leave and the situation is then reassessed. The property, called
consistency in rationing problems, requires that the awards derived in the
new situation for the remaining agents coincide with the ones they received
initially (see Young 1994). Following this property, an interesting question is
to consider the same n = 6 countries (Canada, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia
and the United Kingdom), but limit the total amount of allowed permits to
be allocated among the countries N in a completely di¤erent way. Instead
of taking the 97% of the total of the CO2 emissions of the six countries
in the year 2010, we add the allocated permits of those six countries when
the allocation was done among eight countries (Canada, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom and also with China and the United
States). Therefore, the total amount of allowed permits to be allocated is
N = 4; 472; 916 (1000 metric tons). Then we wonder whether the allocation
induced by the Boltzmann distribution gives the same amount. The following
table is based on Table 2 but without China and the United States:
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Table 4: Emissions permits of the six countries using the Boltzmann dis-
tribution for  = 0.0880: CO2 emissions in 2011 (1000 metric tons) and
the total amount of allowed permits to be allocated among the countries is
N = 4; 472; 916 (1000 metric tons). This table is the same as Table 2,
but taking out data for China and the United States.
Once the limited amount of permits is set, we develop the same probab-
ility distribution among the six countries and here the results:
Table 5: Emissions permits of the new selection of six countries using the
Boltzmann distribution for  = 0.0880: CO2 emissions in 2011 (1000 metric
tons), the Boltzmann probability Pi and the allocated permits (1000 metric
tons). The total amount of allowed permits to be allocated among the
countries is N = 4; 472; 916 (1000 metric tons).
As we can see, the Boltzmann probability for each country Pi has com-
pletely changed, but each country is allocated with the same number of
emissions permits that when China and the United States were considered.
The fourth column of Table 4 and Table 5 are identical. This result implies
that this method of allocation is consistent.
Furthermore, by comparison between exercise (a) and exercise (b) in our
work, we might notice how the total amount of allowed permits to be alloc-
ated among the countries N is greater in exercise (a), so exercise (b) has
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a more restricted number of permits to allocate among the countries. This
restriction is applied to all countries, that is, none of the countries is being
beneted from this restriction and they all get less permits than in exercise
(a). We might extend this concept to politics and say, how when the emis-
sions policy is more restrictive, all the countries will have to reduce their
emissions.
4.3 A tentative application: TAC allocation in sher-
ies
The aim of this subsection is to suggest how the Boltzmann distribution could
be applicable to Total Allowable Catches (TAC) allocation in sheries as
Park et al. (2012) state. Fish species have a limited reproductive capacity. If
shing were not controlled then stocks could cease to be economically viable.
We describe how the process of TAC allocation could be done considering
the European Union (EU) policy in sheries.
1. All EU countries are under the Common Fisheries Policy whose aim
is to ensure high long-term shing prots for all stocks. The TAC al-
location policy was developed in 1983. Each TAC is the shing limit
(expressed in tonnes) set for most of the commercial sh stock. Coun-
tries are responsible for ensuring that their shing quotas have not
been exceeded, while the European Commission establishes the TAC
for each sh stock. In general, TAC are annually set for the majority
of the stocks and each sh stock is based on scientic advice on the
stock status. When a country has shed all the available quota of a
species, shery has to be shut down. Both the TAC and the quotas
are settled annually.
2. TAC allocation is established on the basis of catches in the past.
3. Once the allocation is done, countries can exchange quotas.
As in the preceding application, an agreement on the initial allocation of
the TAC which satises the demands of all countries is complicated. Hence
we outline how this could be done by means of the Boltzmann distribution.
To proceed we suggest the replacement of the concepts used in physics into
the concepts used in TAC allocation:
i The concept of a physical system is replaced by the TAC system which
consists in all participating countries.
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ii The concept of the physical particle is replaced by that of the unit quota.
iii The concept of the physical substates is replaced by that of shing e¤orts
of the participating countries.
iv The energy "i of a physical substate i; is replace is by the catch per unit
of e¤ort of country i.
We admit that the selection of these variables are arguable and that more
work is needed to nd an accurate measure of shing e¤ort, but let us justify
the selection of these variables:
According to Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations,
FAO; shing e¤ort is a measure of the "amount of shing" considering
persons and tools used in the shing activity; for example, the number of
hours or days spent shing, numbers of hooks used (in long-line shing),
kilometers of nets used, etc. Fishing e¤ort can be expressed uniformly as the
number of boat-days per species. Catch refers to the shes taken together
and is usually computed within the logical context of a limited geographical
area for given reference period and for a specic boat/gear category. Catch
Per Unit E¤ort is dened as the quotient between the total shing catch
divided by the total amount of e¤ort invested in the catch.12
To proceed we must assume that shing e¤orts in a country i, get the
same catches across all the shing areas. This implies that we are assuming
the same kind of vessels and techniques etc. in the shing. Therefore, the
probability that a unit quota is allocated to a country i should be proportional
to its total e¤ort.
Several tries for nding data have been done, but we have found di¢ -
culties. For instance, the saithe is a sh whose TAC was reduced between
the years 2014 and 2015. This species is shed in geographical areas of several
sea-territories not all belonging to EU . In addition, we were not successful
in nding the shing e¤ort of each of these countries. These two facts, the
geographical division and the lack of information on the e¤ort, make this
model hard to t the reality in the designed direction. Indeed, more work
has to be done in order to analyze this allocation problem.
5 Conclusions
First of all, let us summarize the principal concepts in physics in which our
work is based on: The Boltzmann distribution of energy in (2) provides the
12http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/y2790e/y2790e03.htm
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most probable distribution in which particles in a physical system in equi-
librium occupy the i-th states with energy Ei. Based on the Boltzmann
distribution, expression (3) provides the probability Pi to nd a system in
a certain state i with energy i, which is inversely proportional to the ex-
ponential function of the energy. Thus, the states with lower energy will
have higher probability of being occupied than the states with higher energy.
These referred systems, in physics, may range from an atom, to a gas in a
tank, and this is the reason why the Boltzmann distribution is very useful
and can be applied in such a variety of cases. In addition, in thermodynam-
ics entropy S is the measure of disorder in the system, i.e. the measure of
unpredictability. In the same way in statistical physics an isolated system
tends to its equilibrium state by maximization of its entropy S, we might
say that an isolated system maximizes the number of accessible microstates

 given by relation (4) that connects the macroscopic and the microscopic
worlds. Finally, the maximum entropy principle states that the probability
distribution that best represents the current state of knowledge is the one
with the largest entropy.
Our starting point in this work was the layout in Dr¼agulescu and Yakovenko
(2000) of speculating whether any conserved quantity in a big statistical sys-
tem in equilibrium, such as economy, follows the Boltzmann distribution. In
the same way energy is conserved in statistical mechanics, money is conserved
in a closed economy with total amount of money M and many economic
agents N . In accordance, the probability distribution of money is given by
(5). It is important to remark that the authors do not claim that the real
economy is in equilibrium. The same way most of the physical world around
us is not in equilibrium either, the concept of statistical equilibrium is just a
useful reference point for studying non-equilibrium phenomena. However, the
bigger the ensemble, the more relevant the concept of statistical equilibrium
is.
The rst economic models considered for the study of the probability
distribution of money P (m) among economic agents were pairwise money
transfer models without debt representing a primitive market. In these mod-
els, agents exchange money m under di¤erent assumptions and restrictive
conditions. Then, development of money balances were studied and rep-
resented in computer simulations. In our work, we have presented some of
these idealized models and we have showed how the Boltzmann probability
distribution does not necessarily hold for any conservative model in economic
settings. When debt is permitted, money conservation still prevails, but the
factor that makes the di¤erence is of course the boundary condition. i.e. if
debt is limited or not. The probability distribution of money P (m) never
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stabilizes as the system never reaches a stationary state. When agentsdebt
is limited, results show how P (m) recovers the exponential shape, but just
shifted up the new limit compared to the limit of no debt.
Once we were familiar with the simplied models presented in Dr¼agulescu
and Yakovenko (2000), we focus on studying the problem of allocation of CO2
emission permits among polluting countries introduced by Park et al. (2012).
For this problem the Boltzmann distribution provides the most probable al-
location of permits among countries. The concept of "most probable" from
physics is interpreted as "fair" in permit allocation. Grandfathering rewards
those countries that have polluted more in the past, while auctioning favors
rich countries. However, the Boltzmann distribution for allocation of permits
does not choose who has the right to pollute and distributes the permits in
an impartial way. The probability distribution depends on population and
emissions per capita of each country and all individuals in a country are con-
sidered to pollute the same. What this distribution does, is to proportionally
allocate permits to a country depending on the limit set in order to reduce
the CO2 pollution.
The  value has to be determined by the countries, so to nd a proper
value might be a di¢ cult task. The limit cases show that when  tends to 0
(egalitarian situation), the probability of getting emission permits depends
only on the population of the countries. While if  tends to1, probability is
greater for the countries with the lowest energy per capita. Results show how
all countries seek  values between 0 and 1: countries with the higher CO2
emissions per capita prefer larger values, while countries with lower emissions
per capita prefer smaller values.
From the updated empirical analysis, the result that stands out is the
dispute between China (that produces the greatest CO2 emissions caused
by the huge population) and the United States (that has the greatest CO2
emissions per capita). Which of these two global powers should be more
responsible for future reduction? The exibility of this allocation of permits
can make them share this responsibility by shifting the value of .
By comparing authors results for 2008 and our results for 2011, for a
small group of countries, we observe the following: The CO2 emissions in the
year 2010 are less than in 2007, fact that makes the number of total available
permits to allocate among the countries smaller. Consequently the reference
value of  calculated by least square is smaller while the probability values
that determine the permit allocation follow a similar pattern.
Indeed, the results depend on the number of countries selected. By elim-
inating the two global powers the number of available allocation permits is
diminished and all the countries get results that change in the same direction.
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Further, for the small group of countries we have also considered the case
in which the CO2 emissions is exactly the sum of what they got initially.
In this case the application of Boltzmann distribution to this new situation
gives the same initial allocation. As we have said in text, this shows the
robustness of the Boltzmann distribution as an allocation procedure. This
exercise invites us to a deeper study of the mathematical properties of the
Boltzmann distribution that could be carried out in a future.
Summing up, Park et al. (2012) suggest that the Boltzmann distribution
can be applied to other allocation problems such as environmental air and
water pollution control, water and food supply management, and sheries
management. Following this suggestion we have outlined how the Boltzmann
distribution could be applied to Total Allowable Catches (TAC) allocation
in sheries. As we have commented in text, our selection of variables are
arguable and more work is needed in order to take this model into practice
by means of empirical data. This could also be a very interesting path to
follow in future studies.
To conclude, we might say that the Boltzmann probability distribution
of statistical mechanics applied to economy in cases of partitioning a limited
resource among multiple agents can be applied in a variety of systems that
surround us. Overall, econophysics research eld is still emerging and many
situations are still to be discovered.
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